Allawi and the Sunni Strategy

In my last post, I discussed how the recent rise Ayad Allawi has brought up rather unpleasant memories of Washington’s king-making in the past. Beyond Vietnam, Diem, and all that, there is also a pressing question of what Allawi’s second life might have to do with what Seymore Hersh has called Washington’s tactical "redirection."

First, a little recent history.

Allawi’s original stint in the prime minister’s chair came to an end with the election of 2005—that brief, shining moment for Bush’s dream of democratizing the Middle East—as he handed off the PM post to Nouri al-Maliki. At the time some perceptive commentators grasped that the 2005 election was not so much a victory for "the people" as one for the Iraqi Shia who constitute a broad majority and thus naturally have much to gain from any kind of democratic system. Al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, which won the day, is explicitly Shi’ite in its organization and philosophy just as Saddam’s Ba’ath Party was the party for the Sunni).

In turn, the 2005 Shia victory meant increased influence for Iran where Shia Islam is firmly in the saddle. It should have thus come as no surprise that Tehran—the staunchest of enemies of the Untied States—nonetheless diplomatically recognized the Quisling government in Baghdad. Tehran did this not out of some deep admiration for democracy but simply because it grasped that it had much to gain with the Shia in charge.

Instead of choosing to work with Iran—a government which clearly also wants a stable state to emerge in Iraq—Washington has instead made Tehran numero uno on its hit-list.

In turn, the Bushies in the media have made a concerted effort to de-emphasize the dysfunctional democracy in Baghdad and sing the praises of progress being made in Sunni regions, most especially Anbar province where Bush recently made a presidential visit. (Lindsey Graham has been particularly assiduous in stressing this point in his Sunday morning appearances).

In this line, the usual suspects have emphasized that Sunnis who were formerly part of the insurgency have been essentially switching sides and backing U.S. forces.

While this is sounds like good news, it would disastrous if Washington decides to integrate this Sunni rapprochement into some kind of "redirection" strategy against Shia Iran.

How Allawi might function within all this is far from clear. Allawi himself is a Shia muslim—albeit a secular nationalist and one who was once a prominent member of the almost entirely Sunni Ba’ath Party. At the very least, he seems more than willing to work with Washington, and this can make him very useful if the powers that be decied to get rid of al-Maliki.

If Bush, Cheney & Co. really want to take the neocons’ advice and bomb Iran before the end of the term, then in installing Allawi, they might not just be searching for someone to end petty sectarian squabbling in the capital but someone to fortify Iraq as they open up a new front.

Our Once and Future S.O.B.

His name was Ayad Allawi. He was a former Ba’athist and certified tough guy appointed by Washington as the interim prime minister of Iraq. Newsweek dubbed him "our new s.o.b.” Rumors abounded of summary executions; some even speculated about a rather Saddam-esque dictatorship emerging in Baghdad.

With the 2005 election and the waving of purple fingers, he went down a memory hole. But Alawi is now very much back in the news, and it’s again become necessary to speculate on who this cagey, obviously ambitious man really is.

The first thing to note is that Allawi is mounting his comeback in Washington, not in Bahgdad. In the past few weeks, he’s penned an op-ed for the Washington Post on his "plan for Iraq” and contracted the DC lobbying firm Barbour Griffin & Rogers, which has long had ties to the GOP. Barbour has recently purchased the domain name http://www.allawi-for-iraq.com/ for the launch of some kind of Internet propaganda campaign, the character of which is still uncertain.

Most likely, Allawi has his heart set on once again becoming PM; he seems to also think that this would be much easier if he could again get Wahsington to appoint him to the post (elections being unreliable).

Allawi’s moves come on the heels of rather sever criticism of the current Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Some have even forthrightly called for al-Maliki’s removal—most recently, Hillary and French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner have gotten in on the act.. Bush might have called al-Maliki "a good guy” but it seems more and more likely that Washington might want to simply blame him for all the problems and then enact a purge. Sensing the mood, in his Post op-ed, Allawi explicitly states that parliamentary malfunction is all al-Maliki’s fault.

Al-Maliki hasn’t much helped his cause; however, one should be reminded of the rather bad history of Washington’s picking and choosing the leaders of dependent nations. Since Bush is so fond of Vietnam analogies, let’s go there!

In 1945—before Washington was on Cold War footing with Moscow—the OSS supported Ho Chi Minh’s Communist coup d’état in Indochina. A decade later, after French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower backed the pro-Western Ngo Dien Diem—a prime minister lacking in democratic legitimacy. Only 10 years later, as Kennedy sent thousands of soldiers into the region, he grew tired of Diem and authorized a plot which eventuated in Diem’s being abducted from Catholic Mass and shot. The story of America’s involvement in Vietnam gets much worse from there…

Allawi remains a tempting option: an avowed nationalist, he promises to rise above sectarian squabbling. But there’s no S.O.B. on earth who could redeem Washington’s strategic failures. Serial king-making often accompanies quagmires.